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elusion that, under the circumstances there shown, if those 
facts now can be accepted as true, the conviction of James 
was in clear violation of his constitutional rights and he is 
entitled to have it set aside. 
However, I see no reason for here referring to the law 
which would be applicable in the event that James is tried and 
convicted of manslaughter. That is a contingency which has 
nothing to do with the decision in the present proceeding. 
[L. A. ~o. 21949. In Bank. Jan. 25, 1952.] 
WARREN COVERSTONE, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v. 
L. N. DAVIES, Individually and as Deputy Sheriff, etc., 
et al., Respondents. 
[L. A. No. 21950. In Bank. Jan. 25, 1952.] 
WII1LIAM L. MOCK, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v. L. N. 
DAVIES, Individually and as Deputy Sheriff, etc., et al., 
Respondents. 
[L. A. No. 21951. In Bank. Jan. 25, 1952.] 
ROLLA D. MOCK et al., Appellants, v. L. N. DAVIES, In-
dividually and as Deputy Sheriff, etc., et al., Respond-
ents. 
[1] False Imprisonment-Questions of Law and Fact.-Presump-
tion of illegality of an arrest arising on allegations of 
arrest without a warrant and a subsequent confinement can-
not warrant submission of a cause to jury where the evi-
dence demonstrates the legality of the arrest as having 
been made for a public offense committed or attempted in 
the arresting officers' presence. (Pen. Code, § 836.) 
[2] !d.-Arrest Without Warrant in Criminal Cases.-Fact that 
plaintiffs arrested without a warrant for unlawful assem-
bly were exonerated in the criminal proceeding has no bear-
ing on the legality of t:1e arrest. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] False Imprisonment, § 25; [2] False 
Imprisonment, § 6; [3] Breach of the Peace, § 2; [ 4, 6, 9] Arrest, 
§7; [5] Arrest, §12; [7] Arrest, §6; [8] Arrest, §13; [10] 
Malicious Prosecution, § 4; [11-15] Privacy; [16] False Imprison-
ment, § 14; Malicious Prosecution, § 4. 
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[3] Breach of the Peace-Unlawful Assembly.-Illeg-al purpose 
of group assembled to view a "hot-rod" race renders action 
of group knowingly participating- therein an unlawful as-
sembly within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 407. 
[4] Arrest-Without Warrant-Offense Committed in Presence 
of Arresting Officers.-Officers arriving on the scene where 
a group is assembled to view a "hot-rod" race have author-
ity to arrest without a warrant all who are engaged in 
commission of the unlawful act, and are entitled to act on 
reasonable appearances in determining who are parties to 
the offense. 
[5a, 5b] Id.- Without Warrant- Probable Cause.- Authorized 
peace officers may make an arrest without warrant for a 
crime which they have probable cause to believe is being 
committed in their presence, although it be a misdemeanor. 
(Disapproving language in People v. Pe1·ry, 79 Cal.App.2d 
Supp. 906; 180 P.2d 465, and any implication in language 
of Ware v. Dunn, 80 Cal.App.2d 936; 183 P.2d 128 .and 
Collins v. Owens, 77 Cal.App.2d 713; 176 P.2d 372, insofar 
as such language denies application of doctrine of probable 
cause to such a situation.) 
[6] !d.-Without Warrant-Offense Committed in Presence of 
Arresting Officers.-A public offense is committed in the 
presence of an officer within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 836, 
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when circumstances 
exist which would cause a reasonable person to believe that 
a crime has been committed in his presence. 
[7] !d.-Without Warrant-Circumstances Justifying.-The ut-
most that can be exacted of an officer who arrests without 
a warrant is that the circumstances shall be such that upon 
them alone he would be justified in making a complaint 
on which a warrant might issue. 
[8] !d.-Making Arrest-Necessity for Warrant.-When an arrest 
for a misdemeanor is made on the complaint of one other 
than the arresting officer, it is proper to require the secur-
ing of a warrant to justify the arrest. 
[9] !d.-Without Warrant-Offense Committed in Presence of 
Arresting Officers.-A warrant is not required to make an 
arrest for a misdemeanor when the officer sees that in all 
probability .a public offense i~ · ing committed in his pres-
[3] What constitutes offense of unlawful assembly, notes, 58 
A.L.R., 751; 93 A.L.R., 737. See, also, Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., 
Breach of the Peace, § 5a; Am.Jur., Riots and Unlawful As-
sembly, § 3. 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Arrest, § 3; Am.Jur., Ar!'est, § 24. 
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cnce, since to require a warrant in such a situation would 
hamper law enforcement officers in their everyday enforce-
ment of the law. 
[10] Malicious Prosecution-Against Whom Action Maintainable. 
-A cause of action against police officers for maliciously 
instituting a criminal proceeding against plaintiffs may not 
be maintained where such officers were acting within the 
·scope of their authority in making arrests for an offense 
which they had reasonable cause to believe was being com-
mitted in their presence. 
[11] Privacy-Extent and Limitations on Right.-Right of ac-
tion for invasion of one's privacy may not be maintained 
merely because his business has declined as a. result of pub-
licity attendant on his son's arrest and prosecution for a 
crime. 
[12] !d.-Nature of Right.-'l'he gravamen of the tort of in-
vasion of one's privacy is ordinarily the unwarranted pub-
lication by defendant of intimate details of plaintiff's pri-
vate life. 
[13] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-Facts concerning 
arrest and prosecution of those charged with violation of 
the law are matters of general public interest, and pub-
lication of details of such official actions cannot, in the ab-
sence of defamatory statements, he actionable. 
[14] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-Right of privacy 
does not exist in the dissemination of news and news events, 
nor: in the discussion of the events of the life of a person 
in whom the public has a rightful interest. 
[15] !d.-Extent and Limitations on Right.-Right to recover 
for invasion of one's privacy will not be allowed where de-
fendant's wrongful act was directed toward a third per-
son and where, only as an incident to that act, is the claim 
made that plaintiff's privacy has been violated. 
[16] False Imprisonment-Nature of Action: Malicious Prosecu-
tion-By Whom Action Maintainable.-Actions for false 
arrest and malicious prosecution are personal actions which 
do not give rise to a cause of action in anyone other than 
t.he person directly aggrieved. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. 'l'hurmond Clarke, Judge. Affirmed. 
(12] Right of privacy, notes, 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446; 
14 A.L.R. (2d) 750. See, also, Cal.Jur., Privacy; Am.Jur., Pri-
vacy, §§ 2, 5, 9. 
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Actions for false arrest, malicious prosecution, assault and 
battery, conspiracy, trespass, and invasion of privacy. Judg-
ments of nonsuit affirmed. 
C. Paul DuBois and R. D. Mock for Appellants. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), Wm. 
E. Lamoreaux, Deputy County Counsel, H. Burton Noble, 
City Attorney (Pasadena), Frank L. Kostlan, Assistant City 
Attorney, Robert E. Michalski, Deputy City Attorney, Crider, 
Runkle & Tilson, Donald Ruppe and Anderson, McPharlin & 
Conners for Respondents. 
SPENCE, J.-Warren Coverstone and William L. Mock, 
by their respective guardians ad litem, brought actions against 
the sheriff of Los Angeles County and five of his deputies; the 
city manager, chief of police and three police officers of the 
city of Pasadena; and their respective sureties; charging 
(a) false arrest, (b) malicious prosecution, (c) assault and 
battery, and (d) conspiracy and trespass, based upon the 
arrest of these plaintiffs and their subsequent trial wherein 
they were acquitted. Rolla D. Mock and Velma M. Mock, the 
parents of William J_~. Mock, also brought an action against the 
same defendants for an alleged violation of their right of 
privacy predicated upon the publicity attendant upon the ar-
rest and trial of their son. The three cases were consolidated 
for trial. At the close of plaintiffs' cases, nonsuits were 
granted as to all defendants on their motions therefor. Plain-
tiffs have appealed from the judgments entered accordingly. 
Plaintiffs contend that the nonsuits were improper because 
they had made out prima facie cases against all defendants. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs 
and disregarding conflicts, in accordance with the settled rule 
in testing the propriety of nonsuits (Lawless v. Calaway, 24 
Cal.2d 81, 85 [147 P.2d 604] ; Lashley v. Koerber, 26 Cal.2d 
83, 84-85 [156 P.2d 441] ; McCurdy v. Hatfield, 30 Cal.2d 492, 
493 [183 P.2d 269] ), we have concluded that plaintiffs' con-
tentions cannot be sustained, and that the judgments of non-
suits were therefore proper. 
On January 17, 1947, a group of students from Pasadena 
Junior College had gathered near the intersection of Sierra 
Madre Boulevard and Sierra Madre Villa in Los Angeles 
County. Their purpose was to view a "hot-rod" race. Plain-
tiffs Warren Coverstone and 'iVilliam Mock were in the group, 
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but claimed upon the trial that they did not know that a race 
had been proposed or was in progress. Defendants Mansell 
and Hoskins, two of the deputy sheriffs involved, arrived on 
the scene in a patrol car and ordered the group to stay to-
gether. Shortly thereafter these officers were reinforced by 
Captain Cook and Deputy Davies of the sheriff's office and 
Officer Frakes and two other uniformed officers from the Pasa-
dena City Police . 
.At the behest of Officer Frakes, the students were taken into 
custody and escorted to the sheriff's .Altadena substation. 
There Coverstone and Mock were segregated from the group 
because they were over 18 years of age, and were taken to the 
city jail by Deputies Mortenson and Knezevich. The youths 
were received at the city jail and conducted through the usual 
procedure, including booking, photographing, and :fingerprint-
ing. They were searched and their personal belongings were 
removed. .After several hours they were released upon their 
own recognizance, and their personal belongings were returned. 
On January 20, 1947, they were arraigned on a complaint 
signed by defendant Davies, which charged violation of Penal 
Code, section 407 (unlawful assembly). They pleaded not 
guilty, and were subsequently tried on the charge and ac-
quitted. 
Plaintiffs contend that the above-recited facts are sufficient 
upon which to predicate a cause of action for unlawful arrest, 
in that the arrests were made without a warrant and the crimi-
nal proceeding terminated in a verdict of not guilty. [1] While 
for the purposes of pleading, it has been held that the illegality 
of an arrest is presumed upon allegations of an arrest without 
a warrant and a subsequent confinement (Kaufman v. Brown, 
93 Cal..App.2d 508, 512 [209 P.2d 156]; Mackie v. Ambassador 
Hotel & Inv. Corp., 123 Cal..App. 215, 221 [11 P.2d 3]) such 
presumption cannot warrant submission of a cause to the jury 
where as here the record demonstrates the legality of the ar-
rest. [2] The fact that plaintiffs Coverstone and Mock were 
exonerated in the criminal proceeding has no bearing upon 
the legality of the arrest. ( Cf. Neves v. Costa, 5 Cal..App. 111, 
118 [89 P. 860]; Wilson v. Lottstalot, 85 Cal..App.2d 316, 325 
[193 P.2d 127], to the effect that the :finding of guilt in the 
subsequent criminal proceeding cannot legalize an arrest un-
lawful when made. The converse would appear to be equally 
true.) Since it is settled that a peace officer may lawfully 
make an arrest for a public offense committed or attempted in 
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his presence (Pen. Code, § 836), the critical question present@d 
in this case is whether the acts done in the presence of the 
arresting officer justified the arrests being made without a 
warrant. 
[3] It is not disputed that the group was assembled to 
view a ''hot-rod'' race. Such illegal purpose renders the ac-
tion of the group knowingly participating therein an unlaw-
ful assembly within the meaning of section 407 of the Penal 
Code. [4] When the officers arrived upon the scene, they 
had the authority to arrest all those engaged in the commis-
sion of the m~lawful act, and in our view they were entitled 
to act on reasonable appearances in determining who were 
parties to the offense. It is patent that the officers acted upon 
probable cause in arresting Mock and Coverstone as members 
of the unlawful assembly. Such being the case, the arrests 
were lawful as being arrests for acts committed in the officers' 
presence. 
[5a] 'l'hus as was said in Garske v. United States, 1 F.2d 
620, 622, a search and seizure case: "It is the well-established 
doctrine now throughout the United States that for a crime, 
which they have probable cause to believe is being committed 
in their presence, though it be a misdemeanor, duly authorized 
peace officers may make an arrest without a warrant.'' [6] Or 
to state the same proposition in another fashion, a public of-
fense is committed in the presence of an officer within the 
meaning of a statute such as Penal Code, § 836, when "circum-
stances exist that would cause a reasonable person to believe 
that a crime has been committed in his presence." (Ryan v. 
Conover, 59 Ohio App. 361, 364 [18 N.E.2d 277] .) Such rule, 
stated in the one form or the other, is consistently followed 
in the federal courts (United States v. Wiggins, 22 F.2d 1001, 
1002; Peru v. United States, 4 F.2d 881, 883; United States v. 
Stafford, 296 F. 702, 704-705) and in many state courts (State 
v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 229 [125 A. 636] ; Hill v. Day, 
168 Kan. 604 [215 P.2d 219, 224] ; Commonwealth v. Chaplin, 
307 Ky. 630, 636 [211 S.W.2d 841] ; Giannini v. Garland, 296 
Ky. 361, 366 r177 S.W.2d 133] ; Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478, 
481-482 [152 P.2d 886] ; People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 
872 [194 N.Y.S. 326] ; Bock v. City of Cincinnati and 
Tapp v. City of Cincinnati, 43 Ohio App. 257, 261-263 [183 
N.E. 119], error dismissed, 124 Ohio St. 666, 667 [181 N.E. 
879, 888]; Noce v. Ritchie, 109 W.Va. 391, 392 [155 S.E. 127]; 
State ex rel. Verdis v. Fidelity&; Cas. Co. of New York, 120 
W.Va. 593, 597 [199 S.E. 884]; State v. Rigsby, 124 W.Va. 
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344, 349-350 [20 S.E.2d 906]). With respect to such mis-
demeanor as is here involved, the rule is embodied in the com-
mon law ofEngland (9 Halsbury's Laws of England § 117, 
p. 88) and has found expression in section 142 of the Restate-
ment of the Law of Torts. [7] .As stated in State v. Mullen, 
63 Mont. 50, 58 [207 P. 634] : "Whatever else may be said 
upon that subject, the utmost that can be exacted of the officer 
who arrests without a warrant is that the circumstances shall 
be such that upon them alone he would be justified in making 
a complaint upon which a warrant might issue." 
[5b] Plaintiffs, however, cite and rely upon language in 
certain California cases to the effect that the doctrine of prob-
able cause is inapplicable to arrests without a warrant in cases 
of misdemeanor. (Ware v. Dunn, 80 Cal..App.2d 936, 943 
(183 P.2d 128] ; Collins v. Owens, 77 Cal..App.2d 713, 718 
[176 P.2d 372]; People v. Perry, 79 Cal.App.2d Supp. 906, 
908-909 (180 P.2d 465] .) The Ware and Collins cases involved 
situations in which the arrests were made upon the complaint 
of others. The facts indicated that no offense had been com-
mitted in the presence of the arresting officers. The facts in 
the Perry case, on the other hand, appear to be somewhat 
similar to those presented here, although it does not appear 
whether the officer was justified in making any arrest under 
the circumstances, let alone the arrest in question. However, 
we deem the language of the Perry case, and any implication 
in the language of the other cases, to be incorrect insofar as 
such language denies the application of the doctrine of prob-
able cause to a situation in which an officer makes an arrest 
for acts done within his presence, which acts would cause a 
reasonable person to conclude that a public offense is being 
committed by the person who is arrested. 
[8] When an arrest for a misdemeanor is made upon the 
complaint of one other than the arresting officer, it is proper 
to require the securing of a warrant to justify the arrest. 
(Ware v. Dunn, supra, 80 Cal . .App.2d 936.) [9] However, 
to make the same requirement, when the officer sees that in 
all probability a public offense is being committed in his 
presence, would be to hamper law enforcement officers in their 
everyday enforcement of the law. Peace officers would be 
reluctant to make arrests for fear that they would be held 
liable for having made an honest and reasonable mistake. It 
is thus manifest that the day-to-day problems of law enforce-
38 C.2d-11 
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ment require that peace officers be allowed to act without fear 
of being held liable upon the facts as they see them, provided 
such facts would lead a reasonable person to conclude that 
he was witnessing the commission of a public offense by the 
person arrested. 
[10] Plaintiffs next contend that the facts sustain a cause 
of action against Captain Cook and Deputy Davies of the Los 
Angeles county sheriff's office for maliciously instituting the 
criminal proceeding against plaintiffs Mock and Coverstone. 
However, it is not contended, nor could it be contended upon 
the record as here presented, that defendants were acting out-
side the scope of their authority. Such being the case, the 
principles announced in WMte v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727 [235 
P.2d 209], are applicable, and the record does not sustain a 
cause of action on that theory. 
Inasmuch as the asserted causes of action for trespass, as-
sault and battery, and conspiracy are dependent upon the un-
lawfulness of the arrest or the subsequent prosecution, it is 
patent that these plaintiffs, having failed to establish prima 
facie cases on the theories of false imprisonment or malicious 
prosecution, cannot prevail upon the other theories. 
Finally, the parents of William Mock contend that defend-
ants are liable for the damages caused them, apart from those 
caused their son, on the theory that their right of privacy 
has been violated. 'rhere is evidence to show that Mr. Mock is, 
and was at the time in question, an attorney, licensed to prac-
tice in Iowa, and a certified public accountant, licensed to prac-
tice in California; that on January 17, 1947, he had a flourish-
ing practice in Pasadena; that the publicity attendant upon 
his son's arrest and prosecution caused the business to decline, 
and caused friends to shun the Mocks; that ultimately, Mock 
was forced to abandon his practice in Pasadena and return 
to Des Moines, Iowa, where he is presently practicing; and 
that in addition to his business losses, Mock paid $500 in 
attorney's fees and $111 in incidental costs of investigation 
necessary in the defense of his son. 
[11] While the right of action for the invasion of one's 
privacy is recognized in California (Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. 
App. 285, 289-291 [297 P. 91] ; Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 
Inc., 53 Cal.App.2d 207, 210 [127 P.2d 577]; Metter v. Los 
Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal.App.2d 304, 309 [95 P.2d 491] ), 
it is clear that the principles which govern the right to recover 
on such theory do not encompass the facts asserted herein. 
(See Melvin v. Reid, supra, 112 Cal.App. 285, 290.) [12] The 
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gravamen of the tort is ordinarily the unwarranted publica-
tion by defendant of intimate details of plaintiff's private life. 
(See annos. 138 A.L.R. 22; 168 A.L.R. 446.) 
[13] In the instant case there is no such unwarranted pub-
lication by defendants of intimate details of plaintiffs' private 
lives. Even if it be assumed that defendants were the legal 
cause of the publicity concerning the arrest and subsequent 
prosecution of plaintiffs' son, the conclusion is inescapable 
that such publicity was not of such nature as to give rise to 
a cause of action in plaintiffs. The facts concerning the arrest 
and prosecution of those charged with violation of the law are 
matters of general public interest. Therefore the publication 
of details of such official actions cannot, in the absence of de-
famatory statements, be actionable. (Metter v. Los Angeles 
Examiner, stlpra, 35 Cal.App.2d 304.) The last cited case is 
peculiarly pertinent to the issue presented herein. In that 
case, plaintiff's wife had committed suicide in a rather bizarre 
manner. Defendant newspaper had published an account 
of the tragedy together with pictures of her and the building 
from which she had plunged to her death. Plaintiff was men-
tioned only as her husband and was quoted as to the circum-
stances surrounding her suicide. It was held that plaintiff 
had suffered no actionable invasion of his privacy, the court 
stating: ''There are times, however, when one, whether will-
ingly or not, becomes an actor in an occurrence of public or 
general interest. When this takes place he emerges from his 
seclusion, and it is not an invasion of his right of privacy to 
publish his photograph with an account of such occurrence.'' 
(35 Cal.App.2d 304, 309.) [14] Further, as pointed out in 
Melvin v. Reid, s·upra, 112 Cal.App. 285, 290, the right of pri-
vacy does not exist ''in the dissemination of news and news 
events, nor in the discussion of events of the life of a person in 
whom the public has a rightful interest. . . . '' 
[15] So far as the briefs and independent research have 
revealed, there have been no instances wherein courts have 
allowed recovery on this theory, where defendant's alleged 
wrongful act was directed toward a third person, and only as 
an incident to that act was it claimed that plaintiff's privacy 
had been invaded. Neither reason nor authority indicates 
that there should.be an extension of liability to cover such a 
situation. Such a rule would open the courts to persons whose 
only relation to the asserted wrong is that they are related 
to the victim of the wrongdoer and were therefore brought 
324 COVERSTONE v. DAVIES [38 C.2d 
unwillingly into the limelight. Every defamation, false im-
prisonment, and malicious prosecution would then be an ac-
tionable invasion of the privacy of the relatives of the victim. 
[16] It is thus apparent, as defendants maintain, that 
there is no need in this case to depart from the established 
rule that actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution 
are personal actions which do not give rise to a cause of action 
in anyone other than the person directly aggrieved. ( 34 Am. 
Jur. § 82, p. 754; 39 Am.Jur. § 75, p. 719; Rogers v. Smith, 
17 Ind. 323, 324 [79 Am.Dec. 483] ; Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 
1087, 1089 [41 So. 323].) 
The judgments are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, ,J., and 'rraynor, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority of this court is, apparently, determined that 
no action for false arrest, false imprisonment or malicious 
prosecution shall lie against anyone connected with the en-
forcement of the law (see White v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727 
[235 P.2d 209]). To achieve this result it is, of course, neces-
sary here, as in the White case, to assume certain facts which 
do not appear of record. In the White case it was necessary 
for the court to assume that the one making the arrest and 
filing the charges was a deputy of the Fish and Game Commis-
sion. Without this assumption, the defendant there would 
have had no authority to make or procure an arrest for an 
alleged violation of the Fish and Game Code. In the instant 
case, a different assumption is made, but in my opinion, one 
on which the affirmance of the judgments of nonsuit rests. 
The young men in the instant case were arrested and 
charged with a violation of section 407 of the Penal Code. 
That section provides that: "Whenever two or more persons 
assemble together to do an unlawful act, and separate without 
doing or advancing toward it, or do a lawful act in a violent, 
boisterous, or tumultuous manner, such assembly is an unlaw-
ful assembly." The record shows that a group of students 
were gathered near the intersection of two streets in Los An-
geles. The record is not so clear as the majority would have 
us believe that "their purpose was to view a 'hot-rod' race." 
These boys were found not guilty by a jury of the misdemeanor 
with which they were charged pnrsuant to the above Penal 
Code section. It appears to me that only two implications 
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can be drawn from the verdict: That they were not assembled 
to do an unlawful act or that the lawful act for which they 
were assembled was not being carried forward in a ''violent, 
boisterous, or tumultuous manner" as provided in the Penal 
Code. It is undisputed that the boys were present together 
with a number of other students so that there was an assembly 
of two or more persons. It is stated in the majority opinion 
that ''Since . . . a peace officer may lawfully made an arrest 
for a public offense committed or attempted in his presence 
(Pen. Code, § 836), the critical question presented in this case 
is whether the acts done in the presence of the arresting officer 
justified the arrests being made without a warrant. 
''It is not disputed that the group was assembled to view a 
'hot-rod' race. Such illegal purpose renders the action of the 
grmtp knowingly participating therein an unlawful assembly 
within the meaning of section 407 of the Penal Code.'' 
(Italics added.) But the jury, by its verdict, found no illegal 
purpose. There is no evidence that these boys participated 
in the hot-rod race, or that they even knew that there was going 
to be one at that time and place. In People v. Palmer, 76 Cal. 
App.2d 679,685 [173 P.2d 680], it was said:" ... it is well 
settled that the question of whether or not a person who is 
shown to have been present at the time and place of the com-
mission of a crime has aided and abetted therein is one of fact 
for the jury to decide from all the circumstances proved.'' 
And the jury here returned a verdict of "not guilty." The 
mere fact that the boys were present when the officers arrived 
does not constitute the existence of such circumstances as 
would cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime was 
being committed in the presence of the officers so as to warrant 
an arrest without a warrant. Under the holding in this case, 
an officer could arrest any innocent bystander who unfortu-
nately happened to be passing by the scene of any crime, im-
prison him, and then say that because he happened to be in 
the vicinity, there was probable cause to believe him guilty. 
It is specifically provided (Pen. Code, § 836) that a peace 
officer may arrest a person, without a warrant ''for a public 
offense committed or attempted in his presence.'' These boys 
were standing on the bank by the side of the road when they 
were arrested. One who is merely a spectator at the scene of 
a crime, who does not participate therein, nor aid or abet its 
commission, cannot be held as a party to it. (People v. Wood-
ward, 45 Cal. 293 [13 A.m.Rep. 176].) 
326 CoVERSTONE v. DAviEs [38 C.2d 
It seems that the majority feels that the arrest and imprison-
went were lawful because the boys were assembled at that 
particular spot for an illegal purpose. In so doing, the ver-
dict in the criminal case is, by implication, set aside. For there 
the verdict showed that there had not been an illegal purpose 
in the assemblage of the young people. 
So far as the imprisonment is concerned, after the boys 
were arrested without a warrant, the plaintiffs' evidence shows 
that they were not taken before a magistrate prior to incarcer-
ating them and that there were no orders of commitment, 
which conduct of the officers was contrary to sections 145 
and 849 of the Penal Code. Retention of prisoners for an 
unnecessary period of time without a magistrate's commitment 
order, constitutes false imprisonment. (Gomez v. Scanlan, 155 
Cal. 528 [102 P. 12].) 
There is also evidence in the record from which it could 
be found that the complaint was filed by the police officers 
against these plaintiffs to avoid the possibility of lawsuits 
for false arrest and imprisonment. Mr. Mock, father of one 
of the plaintiffs, testified that Captain Cook, one of the de-
fendants here, called him to his office and remarked that 
a complaint had not been filed against the boys but that 
unless they (the police) were released from liability they 
would have to do so to protect themselves. In Franzen v. 
Shenk, 192 Cal. 572, 580-583 [221 P. 932], it was said: 
''. . . if it appears anywhere during the trial . . . that the 
defendant did not actually believe in the guilt of the person 
charg·ed with crime, then that fact is an essential element 
to be considered in the determination of the question of 
whether or not the defendant had probable cause. 
'' ... the same evidence which tends to prove malice may 
also, if it indicates a lack of belief on the part of the de-
fendant in the guilt of the plaintiff, tend to prove want of 
probable cause .... If, on the other hand, in addition to 
malice, there was a lack of belief by the defendant in the 
guilt of the plaintiff, there was want of probable cause, 
despite the existence of facts which would justify the sus-
picions of a reasonable man in the guilt of the accused.'' 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plain-
tiffs and disregarding conflicts as this court must do in 
testing the propriety of nonsuits, it appears to me that 
there was ample evidence from which the jury could have 
found that these defendants did not themselves believe that 
they ·had either probable cause or reasonable grounds for the 
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arrest, imprisonment or prosecution of these plaintiffs. No 
officer should be permitted to bring unwarranted, unfounded 
charges against any individual for the purpose of render-
ing himself immune from liability. 
I am of the opinion now, as I was when I wrote my dis-
sent in White v. Towers, supra, that the protection of in-
dividual rights should be zealously guarded from unwar-
ranted police action and that the privilege of police im-
munity should not be so extended that it protects any law 
enforcement officer who chooses to make an arrest on mere 
suspicion or conjecture. 
The majority decision in this case is another step in sup-
port of the police state philosophy which the majority of 
this court has approved and sanctioned in several recent 
decisions (see People v. Rochin, 101 Cal.App.2d 140 [225 
P.2d1], reversed by U. S. Supreme Court, January 2, 1952, 
see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96 
L.Ed. --]; White v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727 [235 P.2d 
209]; People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal.2d 165 [124 P.2d 44] ), 
and demonstrates the absurdity of the argument that a per-
son whose rights have been violated by a peace officer may 
obtain redress against the offending officer. (People v. Gon-
zales, 20 Cal.2d 165, 169 [124 P.2d 44] .) 
I would reverse the judgment as to all defendants. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur generally in the view of the 
law, and in the conclusion stated by Justice Carter. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied February 
21, 1952. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
